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A Social Security Claimant's Statement that She is
Disabled and Unable to Work Does Not Necessarily
Preclude a Subsequent ADA Wrongful Termination
Claim: Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems
Corporation
The Supreme Court of the United States held that the application
for or receipt of social security disability benefits does not
automatically estop a plaintiff from maintaining an ADA claim and
that no rebuttable presumption arises when the two claims
coincide; however, such a plaintiff must be prepared to sufficiently
explain any apparent contradiction between (1) statements of total
disability and inability to work made for the purpose of obtaining
disability benefits and (2) a claim that the plaintiff is able to work
but has been wrongfully terminated under the ADA.
Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corporation, 119 S. Ct.
1597 (1999).
Approximately five months after Policy Management Systems
Corporation' ("PMSC") hired Carolyn Cleveland to perform
background checks on potential employees of PMSC clients,
Cleveland suffered a stroke. 2 The stroke left Cleveland with a
condition called aphasia, 3 which impaired her ability to speak,
4
remember, concentrate, and calculate.
Cleveland then applied for social security disability benefits with
the Social Security Administration, stating that she was "disabled"
and "unable to work."5 While her claim for benefits was pending,
1. Policy Management Systems Corporation is a software company that provides
professional services to insurance and financial service industries. Corporate Info, Welcome
to PMSC (visited Nov. 30, 1999) <http://market.pmsc.com/Corp/corporate.html>.
2. See Brief for Respondent at 2, Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 119 S. Ct.
1597 (1999) (No. 97-1008).
3. Aphasia is defined as the "defect or loss of the power of expression by speech,
writing, or signs, or of comprehending spoken or written language, due to injury or disease
of the brain centers." DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDIcAL DICTONARY 110 (27th ed. 1994).
4. See Brief for Petitioner at 5, Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 119 S. Ct.
1597 (1999) (No. 97-1008).
5. See Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 119 S. Ct. 1597, 1600 (1999).
Cleveland's daughter completed the application because her mother's stroke left her unable
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Cleveland recovered sufficiently to return to work at PMSC.6 She
advised the Social Security Administration of this fact
approximately two weeks later.7 Cleveland did not perform well
upon returning to work and requested a number of
accommodations that she thought would assist her; however, PMSC
denied her requests.8 On July 11, 1994, the Social Security
Administration noted that Cleveland had returned to work and
denied her claim for disability benefitsY PMSC fired Cleveland four
days later for "poor job performance." 10
On September 14, 1994, Cleveland renewed her application for
disability benefits with the Social Security Administration and
stated, "I continue to be disabled;" in supplemental paperwork, she
stated her termination occurred "because I could no longer do the
job because of my condition."1
The Social Security Administration denied her request in
November 1994, and Cleveland responded by requesting a hearing
before an Administrative Law Judge ("AL").'2 Cleveland was
granted a hearing, and on September 29, 1995, the ALT approved
her request for disability benefits effective retroactively to the date
13
of her stroke.
One week before the ALl's decision, Cleveland filed a lawsuit
against PMSC, alleging that the company had wrongfully terminated
her in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
("ADA")' 4 and the Texas Labor Code.' 5 Specifically, Cleveland
to do so, and Cleveland contends that she does not remember providing information for the
application or signing it. See Petitioner's Brief at 6, Cleveland (No. 97-1008).
6. See Cleveland, 119 S. Ct. at 1600.
7. See id. Cleveland described this as an initiative taken by her after receiving
additional paperwork regarding her request for benefits. See Petitioner's Brief at 7, Cleveland
(No. 97-1008). PMSC contended that she provided this information to the Texas
Rehabilitation Commission, the company who received the application from the Social
Security Administration, only after that agency contacted her and that the file maintained by
the Social Security Administration contains no information showing that Cleveland ever
withdrew her claim for disability benefits. See Respondent's Brief at 4, Cleveland (No.
97-1008).
8. See Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 120 F3d 513, 515 (5th Cir. 1997).
Cleveland's requested accommodations included computer training, permission to take work
home in the evening, an alternative position with PMSC, and the assistance of a counselor.
See id.
9.
See Cleveland, 119 S. Ct. at 1600.
10. See Cleveland, 120 F.3d at 515.
11. See id.
12. See Cleveland, 119 S. Ct. at 1600.
13. See id.
14. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994).
15. See Cleveland, 120 F.3d at 515. Cleveland alleged that PMSC violated the Texas
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alleged that her employer violated the ADA by failing to provide
her with reasonable accommodations that would have enabled her
to perform her job. 16 PMSC moved for summary judgment on the
ground that Cleveland could not establish a prima facie case 7
under the ADA because her application for and receipt of social
security disability benefits estopped 8 her from claiming that she
was a "qualified individual with a disability" as defined in the
ADA. 19
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Texas granted PMSC's motion for summary judgment on the ADA
claim.20 In its ruling, the district court agreed with PMSC's
contention that, through her application for and receipt of social
security disability benefits, Cleveland admitted that she was totally
disabled and that such an admission precluded her from proving an
essential element of an ADA claim. 2' In the district court's view,
Cleveland could not prove that she was a qualified individual as
defined by the ADA because of her earlier admission that she was
22
totally disabled.
Cleveland appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, asserting that her application for and receipt of social
security disability benefits did not estop her from proving that she
is a "qualified individual with a disability" under the ADA. 23 The
court of appeals agreed and refused to adopt a "per se rule" that
the application for or receipt of social security disability benefits
Labor Code by retaliating against her for filing a workers' compensation claim. See
Respondent's Brief at 2 n.2, Cleveland (No. 97-1008). This claim was severed from
Cleveland's ADA claim. See id.
16. See Cleveland, 119 S. Ct. at 1600. The ADA prohibits most employers from
discharging a disabled employee if that employee could "perform the essential functions of
the . . . position" with "reasonable accommodation." 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), 12111(8) (1994).
17. "A prima facie case consists of sufficient evidence... to get plaintiff past a motion
for directed verdict in a jury case or motion to dismiss in a nonjury case; it is the evidence
necessary to require a defendant to proceed with his case." BLACK'S LAw DIcrIONARY 1190 (6th
ed. 1990).
18. Estoppel is "[a] principle that provides that an individual is barred from denying or
alleging a certain fact . . . because of that individual's previous conduct, allegation, or
denial." Id. at 551.
19. See Cleveland, 120 E3d at 515. "The term 'qualified individual with a disability'
means an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or
desires." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994).
20. See Cleveland, 120 E3d at 515.
21. See Cleveland, 119 S. Ct at 1600.
22. See id.
23. See Cleveland, 120 F3d at 515.
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"automatically estops" an individual from simultaneously asserting
a discrimination claim under the ADA. 24 The court reasoned that it
was "at least theoretically conceivable" that "under some limited
and highly unusual set of circumstances" the two claims would not
be "mutually exclusive" and offered three points that supported its
25
rationale.
First, the court noted that, while the ADA requires an
individualized inquiry when determining whether an individual is
disabled, the Social Security Act ("SSA") considers some conditions
to be presumptively disabling. 26 Second, the court explained that,
while the ADA requires that consideration be given to whether
reasonable accommodations would enable an individual to perform
her job before making a determination of disability, such a fact is
irrelevant for social security disability benefit purposes.27 Finally,
the court found that because the SSA sometimes permits an
individual to work and still receive disability benefits, an absolute
rule preventing an individual from pursuing both social security
28
disability benefits and an ADA claim would be unsound.
Rather than adopting a per se rule that would bar all claims
under the ADA when the individual has applied for or received
social security disability benefits, the Fifth Circuit held that such an
application or receipt creates a rebuttable presumption 29 that the
24. Id. at 517.
25. Id. Judge Weiner, writing for the unanimous three-judge panel, explained that under
these rare circumstances "the Social Security Administration's determination of an applicant's
entitlement to social security disability benefits would not be synonymous with a
determination that a plaintiff is or is not a 'qualified individual' under the ADA." Id.
26. Id. See, e.g., 20 C.ER. § 404.1520(d) (1997) and 20 C.ER. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1
(1997) (providing an extensive listing of impairments that may automatically qualify an
individual for disability benefits under the SSA).
27. Cleveland, 120 F3d at 517-18. The court referred to a memorandum issued by the
Social Security Administration that stated:
The fact that an individual may be able to return to a past relevant job, provided that
the employer makes accommodations, is not relevant to the issues to be resolved
...
. Hypothetical inquiries about whether an employer would or could make
accommodations that would allow return to a prior job would not be appropriate.
Id. at 518 n.16 (citing DANIEL L. SKOLER, COMM'R SoC. SEC. ADMIN., DISAnrIs ACT INFO. MEM. 2.
No. SG3P2 (1993)).
28. Id. at 518. The court was referring to the trial work period available under the SSA,
which permits an individual to work for up to nine months while still receiving their
disability benefits as well as a provision under the SSA that allows an individual who returns
to work to continue to receive benefits if their earnings fall below a specified statutory level.
See Cleveland, 120 F3d at 518; 20 CER. § 404.1592(a) (1997).
29. A rebuttable presumption "gives particular effect to [a] certain group of facts in
absence of further evidence, and [creates an evidentiary burden] to contradict or rebut [the]
fact presumed." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1267 (6th ed. 1990).
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individual is judicially estopped from claiming that he is a
"qualified individual with a disability" as defined in the ADA.30 The
court suggested that an ADA plaintiff could overcome this
presumption by producing reliable evidence that would
demonstrate why a claim of total disability for benefit purposes is
not inconsistent with a claim of status as a qualified individual with
31
a disability under the ADA.
Nevertheless, when considering Cleveland's contention that her
receipt of social security disability benefits and her ADA claim
were not inconsistent under the rebuttable presumption test, the
Fifth Circuit ruled that she was estopped from asserting that she
was a "qualified individual with a disability" and affirmed the
district court's grant of summary judgment. 32 Because Cleveland
consistently represented that she was totally disabled and unable to
work while pursuing social security disability benefits, the court
would not permit her to assert, in an ADA claim, that she could
have performed the essential functions of her job. 3
The United States Supreme Court granted Cleveland's petition for
a writ of certiorari4 because of a conflict among the circuit courts
of appeal regarding the effect of the application for or receipt of
35
social security disability benefits upon an ADA lawsuit.
In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that the application for
or receipt of social security disability benefits does not
automatically estop a plaintiff from maintaining an ADA claim and
that no rebuttable presumption arises when the two claims
30. Cleveland, 120 F.3d at 518.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. The court stated that "[t]o permit Cleveland to make such an argument in the
face of her prior, consistent, and until now uncontested sworn representations to the Social
Security Administration would be tantamount to condoning her advancement of entirely
inconsistent positions, a factual impossibility and a legal contradiction." Id.
34. Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 525 U.S. 808 (1998).
35. Cleveland, 119 S. Ct at 1601. The two issues upon which the Court granted
certiorari were:
(1) Whether the application for, or receipt of, disability insurance benefits under the
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 423, creates a rebuttable presumption that the
applicant or recipient is judicially estopped from asserting that she is a "qualified
individual with a disability" under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42
U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.; and (2) If it does not create such a presumption, what weight,
if any, should be given to the application for, or receipt of, disability insurance
benefits when a person asserts she is a "qualified individual with a disability" under
the ADA?
Petitioner's Brief at 17, Cleveland (No. 97-1008).
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coincide.
At the outset, the Court noted that this case did not involve
"directly conflicting statements about purely factual matters"
because statements of total disability made in the context of
applying for social security disability benefits suggest "a
The Court repeatedly
conclusion."3
legal
context-related
emphasized that it was leaving the law related to statements
38
containing purely factual contradictions "where we found it."
The Court began its analysis by stating that the SSA and the ADA
serve two different purposes, although both are aimed at helping
individuals with disabilities.3 9 The purpose of the SSA, the Court
noted, is to provide monetary benefits to insured individuals with a
disability.40 The purpose of the ADA is to eliminate unwarranted
36. Cleveland, 119 S. Ct. at 1600. The unanimous ruling is expressed in a single
paragraph that reads as follows:
We believe that, in context, these two seemingly divergent statutory contentions are
often consistent, each with the other. Thus pursuit, and receipt, of SSDI [Social
Security Disability Insurance] benefits does not automatically estop the recipient from
pursuing an ADA claim. Nor does the law erect a strong presumption against the
recipient's success under the ADA. Nonetheless, an ADA plaintiff cannot simply ignore
her SSDI contention that she was too disabled to work. To survive a defendant's
motion for summary judgment, she must explain why that SSDI contention is
consistent with her ADA claim that she could "perform the essential functions" of her
previous job, at least with "reasonable accommodation."
Id.
37. Id. at 1601. Justice Breyer explained that "[an SSA representation of total disability
differs from a purely factual statement in that it often implies a context-related legal
conclusion, namely 'I am disabled for purposes of the Social Security Act.'" Id.
38. Id. at 1601-02, 1603 and 1604 (stating "our consideration of this latter kind of [legal]
statement consequently leaves the law related to the former, purely factual, kind of conflict
where we found it," "as we said, we leave the law in respect to purely factual contradictions
where we found it," "[a]lthough these cases for the most part involve purely factual
contradictions (as to which we do not necessarily endorse these cases, but leave the law as
we found it), we believe a similar insistence upon explanation is warranted here, where the
conflict involves a legal conclusion"). In this last reference, the Court was referring to cases
that have held that a party cannot "create a genuine issue of fact ... simply by contradicting
[a] . . . previous sworn statement." Id. at 1604 (citing Colantuoni v. Alfred Calcagni & Sons,
Inc., 44 E3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1994); Rule v. Brine, Inc., 85 F3d 1002, 1011 (2nd Cir. 1996);
Hackman v. Valley Fair, 932 F2d 239, 241 (3rd Cir. 1991); Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F2d
946, 960 (4th Cir. 1984); Albertson v. T.J. Stevenson & Co., 749 F2d 223, 228 (5th Cir. 1984);
Davidson & Jones Dev. Co. v. Elmore Dev. Co., 921 F2d 1343, 1352 (6th Cir. 1991); Slowiak v.
Land O'Lakes, Inc., 987 E2d 1293, 1297 (7th Cir. 1993); Canifield Tires, Inc. v. Michelin Tire
Corp., 719 F2d 1361, 1365-66 (8th Cir. 1983); Kennedy v. Allied Mutual Ins. Co., 952 F2d 262,
266 (9th Cir. 1991); Franks v. Nimmo, 796 F.2d 1230, 1237 (10th Cir. 1986); Tippens v. Celotex
Corp., 805 E2d 949, 953-54 (l1th Cir. 1986); Pyramid Sec. Ltd. v. lB Resolution, Inc., 924 F2d
1114, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Sinskey v. Pharmacia Ophthalmics, Inc., 982 F2d 494, 498 (Fed.
Cir. 1992)).
39. Id. at 1601.
40. Id. The SSA defines "disability" as an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful
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discrimination against individuals who are disabled. 41 Justice
Stephen Breyer, speaking for the undivided Court, acknowledged
that, on the surface, it may seem logically inconsistent to allow a
plaintiff who claims to be totally disabled in his application for
social security disability benefits to pursue an ADA claim on the
basis that he was a "qualified individual with a disability."42 The
Court disagreed, however, with the Fifth Circuit view that an
individual's application for or receipt of social security disability
benefits warranted the use of a rebuttable presumption to judicially
estop that same individual from advancing a successful ADA
claim. 43
The Court supported its decision by explaining four differences
between the definitions, provisions, and interpretations of the two
statutes that would logically permit claims under each to co-exist."
First, the Court discussed the role of "reasonable accommodation"
under each statute and noted that, while the ADA requires a
claimant to show that he could perform the essential functions of
his job with or without reasonable accommodation, the SSA does
not take into account the existence or use of reasonable
accommodation when making a disability determination. 45 Because
the role of reasonable accommodation is irrelevant in the SSA
context, the Court concluded that a plaintiff could consistently and
simultaneously apply for social security disability benefits under
the SSA and seek recovery for discriminatory treatment under the

ADA. 46

activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can
be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (1994). The
impairment must be "of such severity that [she] is not only unable to do [her] previous work
but cannot, considering [her] age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind
of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." § 423(d)(2)(A). The ADA
defines "disability" as "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of [an] individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(2) (1994).
41. See Cleveland, 119 S. Ct. at 1601.
42. Id. Justice Breyer explained that the Fifth Circuit "thought, in essence, that claims
under both Acts would incorporate two directly conflicting propositions, namely 'I am too
disabled to work' and 'I am not too disabled to work.' Id.
43. Id. Specifically, the Court stated that "despite the appearance of conflict that arises
from the language of the two statutes, the two claims do not inherently conflict to the point
where courts should apply a special negative presumption like the one applied by the Court
of Appeals here." Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Cleveland, 119 S. Ct. at 1602.
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Second, the Court explained that the SSA contained a list of
specific impairments that automatically qualify an individual for
disability benefits. 47 Because it is possible that an individual could
automatically qualify for SSA benefits on this basis and yet still
remain able to perform the essential functions of her job with or
without reasonable accommodation as required by the ADA, the
Court found that it would be inappropriate to altogether bar or
4
establish a negative presumption against a potential ADA claim. 8
Third, the Supreme Court, like the court of appeals, determined
that, because certain provisions of the SSA permit an individual to
work while still receiving disability benefits, it was improper to
automatically apply a rebuttable presumption against an ADA
plaintiff who had applied for or received social security disability
benefits.49 Justice Breyer noted that it is also conceivable that the
nature of an individual's disability at the time she applies for or
receives social security disability benefits may not be the same as
when she files an ADA claim; thus, the two claims may co-exist.5°
Finally, the Court relied on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which allow a plaintiff to proceed on alternative or hypothetical
grounds, and reasoned that an individual who has simply applied
for social security disability benefits should not be hindered by a
51
negative presumption when filing an ADA claim.
Notwithstanding its rejection of the rebuttable presumption
requirement, the Court acknowledged that it was certainly possible
that claims under both statutes could, in fact, conflict and that, in
those cases, summary judgment would be appropriate. 5 The Court
47. Id. When processing a social security disability benefits claim, the Social Security
Administration uses a five-step procedure to gauge whether an individual meets the criteria
for receiving disability benefits. The third step reads: "When your impairment(s) meets or
equals a listed impairment in Appendix 1. If you have an impairment(s) which meets the
duration requirement and is listed in Appendix 1 or is equal to a listed impairment(s), we
will find you disabled without considering your age, education and work experience." 20
C.YR. § 404.1520(d) (1998).
48. Cleveland, 119 S. Ct. at 1603.
49. Id. Like the court of appeals, the Supreme Court was specifically referring to the
trial work period available under the SSA and the availability of benefits when earnings fall
below a specified level. Id. See 20 C.ER. § 404.1592 (1998) and 20 C.YR. § 404.1592a (1998).
50. Id.
51. Id. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that "[a] party may set forth two
or more statements of a claim or defense alternatively or hypothetically ....
A party may
also state as many separate claims or defenses as the party has regardless of consistency."
FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2).
52. Cleveland, 119 S. Ct. at 1603. Summary judgment is appropriate when the plaintiff
"fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to [her]
case, and on which [she] will bear the burden of proof at trial." Id. (citing Celotex Corp. v.

2000

Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp.

explained that, when an ADA plaintiff asserts that she is a
"qualified individual with a disability" and is able to work with or
without reasonable accomodation, but has previously stated that
she was totally disabled in an application for social security
disability benefits, she must provide an explanation to resolve the
apparent conflict in order to avoid summary judgment.5
In the instant case, the Court concluded that Cleveland offered
an explanation of the apparent discrepancy between her two claims
and ruled that she should have been permitted to present these
explanations to the trial court. 4 The Court vacated the judgment of
the court of appeals and remanded the case.m
The enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
was hailed as a sweeping advancement for the civil rights of
disabled individuals.5 The purpose of the ADA is to eliminate
discrimination against disabled Americans. 57 The ADA prohibits
employers from discriminating against qualified individuals with a
disability in application procedures, hiring, advancement, discharge,
compensation, job training, or any other matter affecting
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)).
53. Cleveland, 119 S. Ct. at 1603. The Court stated "an ADA plaintiff cannot simply
ignore the apparent contradiction that arises out of the earlier SSDI [Social Security
Disability Insurance] total disability claim [but] rather, she must proffer a sufficient
explanation." Id. The Court went on to state that the "explanation must be sufficient to
warrant a reasonable juror's concluding that, assuming the truth of, or the plaintiff's good
faith belief in, the earlier statement, the plaintiff could nonetheless 'perform the essential
functions' of her job, with or without 'reasonable accommodation.'" Id. at 1604.
54. Id. The Court noted that Cleveland asserted that her statements made in pursuit of
social security disability benefits were "accurate" if examined "in the time period in which
they were made." Id. (citing Petitioner's Brief at 43, Cleveland, (No. 97-1008)).
55. Cleveland, 119 S.Ct. at 1604.
56. Matthew Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies: The Tensions Between the
Americans with Disabilities Act and Federal Disability Benefit Programs, 76 TEx. L REv.
1003, 1004 (1998). "[H]istory is going to show that in 1990, 26 years after the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 43 million Americans with disabilities, gained freedom, dignity and
opportunity-their civil rights." Id. at 1004 (citing 136 CONG. REC. 89689 (daily ed. July 13,
1990) (statement of Sen. Harkin)).
57. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994). Section 12101(b)
identifies the purpose of the act as follows:
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities; (2) to provide clear, strong,
consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with
disabilities; (3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in
enforcing the standards established in this Act on behalf of individuals with
disabilities; and (4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the
power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to
address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b).

Duquesne Law Review

"694

Vol. 38:685

employment.58 A "qualified individual with a disability" is defined as
"an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
employment position that such individual holds or desires."59
The ADA, however, is not the only federal disability statute; the
Social Security Act contains two programs, Social Security
Disability

Insurance

("SSDI")

(established

in

1956)

and

Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") (established in 1972), which
also address the needs of disabled individuals. 60 These two
programs focus on providing financial support to individuals who
are unable to work due to a disability.6 ' SSDI provides benefits to
disabled workers, while SSI provides benefits to poor individuals
with disabilities. 6 2 Under the SSDI program, an individual is
considered to be disabled "only if his physical or mental
impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only
unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age,
education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of
substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy."63
Although the ADA was enacted after the SSDI program, it did not
change or supersede the disability benefit program. 64 As a result,
the judicial system had to resolve the determination of what effect,
if any, the application for or receipt of social security disability
benefits had on a plaintiff's ADA claim. 65 One line of cases has held
58. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). According to the statute, the term "reasonable
accommodation" may include:
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by
individuals with disabilities; and (B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work
schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisitions or modification of
equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations,
training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and
other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9).
60. The Social Security Disability Insurance program is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 423
(1994). The Supplemental Security Income program is codified at 42 U.S.C. 1381-1383(d)
(1994).
61.

GARY PHELAN AND JANET BOND ARTERTON, DIsABmrry DIscRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE

§ 5:18 at 51-52 (1999).
62. See Diller, supra note 56, at 1005 n.8.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (1994). When determining whether an individual is eligible
for disability benefits under SSDI, no consideration is given to whether "work exists in the
immediate area in which [the individual] lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for
him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
64. See Diller, supra note 53, at 1006. Miller notes that "the disability benefit programs
are rarely mentioned in the legislative history of the ADA." Id.
65. See Id. In addition to the case law addressing the effect, if any, that the application
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that the application for or receipt of such benefits estops or
otherwise precludes a plaintiff from proceeding with an ADA
claim.6 For example, in one of the earliest cases, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina held, in
Reigel v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of North Carolina,67 that

a plaintiff who consistently represented that she was totally
disabled and unable to work on applications for private disability
insurance benefits and social security disability benefits was unable
to demonstrate that she was a qualified individual under the ADA.68
Similarly, in Garcia-Paz v. Swift Textiles, Inc.,69 the United
States District Court for the District of Kansas rejected the ADA
claim of a plaintiff with multiple sclerosis by concluding that the
plaintiff's application for and receipt of both company-sponsored
long-term disability benefits and social security disability benefits
estopped her from claiming that she was a qualified individual with
a disability as required under the ADA.70 The plaintiff argued that
such a decision would undermine the effectiveness of the ADA and
that she should not be estopped from filing an ADA claim because
for or receipt of social security disability benefits has on an ADA claim, there are numerous
cases that address the effect that application for or receipt of worker's compensation
benefits or private insurance benefits has on an ADA claim. See, e.g., Pegues v. Emerson
Elec. Co., 913 F. Supp. 976 (N.D. Miss. 1996) (addressing the effect of receipt of worker's
compensation benefits on ADA claim); Miller v. U.S. Bancorp, 926 F Supp. 113 (S.D.N.Y
1996) (addressing the effect of application for disability benefits available through a company
policy on ADA claim). There are also numerous cases that address the effect of application
for or receipt of any kind of disability benefits on state law disability discrimination claims.
See, e.g., August v. Offices Unlimited, Inc., 981 F2d 576 (1st Cir. 1992) (addressing the effect
of application for private disability insurance benefits on state disability discrimination
claim); Ward v. Westvaco Corp., 859 F Supp. 608 (D. Mass. 1994) (same). Notwithstanding
the differences among these statutes, many courts analogize to these cases to determine the
effect of the application for and receipt of social security disability benefits on a plaintiff's
ADA claim. See, e.g., Reigel v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of N.C., 859 F. Supp. 963 (E.D.N. C .
1994) (relying on August v. Offices Unlimited, Inc., 981 F2d 576 (1st Cir. 1992) and Beauford
v. Father Flanagan's Boys' Home, 831 F2d 768 (8th Cir. 1987)) and Garcia-Paz v. Swift
Textiles, Inc., 873 F. Supp. 547 (D. Kan. 1994).
66. See, e.g., Garcia-Paz,873 F Supp. 547.
67. 859 F. Supp. 963 (E.D.N.C. 1994).
68. Id. at 970. The court, referring to the plaintiffs "patently" contradictory assertions
that she was totally disabled and yet able to work, noted that the plaintiff "cannot speak out
of both sides of her mouth with equal vigor" and granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment Id. at 973, 970.
69. 873 F. Supp. 547 (D. Kan. 1995).
70. Garcia-Paz,873 F Supp. at 555. Karen Garcia-Paz was fired from her position of
account executive because of her "inability to develop and maintain positive relationships."
Id. at 554. She alleged that she suffered from multiple sclerosis, that her employment
problems were related to fatigue caused by her disease, and that her employer had fired her
because of this disability. Id.
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the decision entitling her to disability benefits was made by a third
party. 71 The court found these contentions unpersuasive. 72 Instead,
the court held that her assertions on the disability benefit
applications that she could not perform the essential functions of
her job precluded her, as a matter of law, from maintaining an ADA
73
claim.
Also adopting this reasoning, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit in Kennedy v. Applause, Inc. 74 rejected the
ADA claim of a sales representative who alleged that she was fired
due to the effects of chronic fatigue syndrome because she had
made statements in both state disability and social security
disability applications that she was "completely disabled for all
work-related purposes."75 The court affirmed the trial court's
summary judgment decision based on its conclusion that the
plaintiff's sworn statements on the disability benefit applications,
along with her physician's testimony that she was completely
disabled, outweighed her deposition testimony that she was not
76
totally disabled and was a qualified individual under the ADA.
On the same day, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit decided McNemar v. The Disney Store, Inc.,77 a case
involving an HIV-positive plaintiff who claimed he was fired in
violation of the ADA. 78 After he was terminated, he sought and was
71. Id. at 555-56.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 556.
74. 90 F.3d 1477 (9th Cir. 1996).
75. Kennedy, 90 F.3d at 1481 n.2. The court also noted that Kennedy's personal
physician judged her to be unable to work for any purposes. Id. at 1480.
76. Id. at 1481. The court found it unnecessary to invoke the doctrine of judicial
estoppel because it found there to be no genuine issue of material fact and, therefore,
determined that summary judgment was a more appropriate resolution of the case. Id at n.3.
The court described the plaintiff's deposition in her ADA claim as "uncorroborated and
self-serving," noted that it "flatly contradict[ed] both her prior sworn statements and the
medical evidence," and concluded that it did not present- "a sufficient disagreement to
require submission to a jury." Id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52
(1986)).
77. 91 F3d 610 (3rd Cir. 1996).
78. McNemar, 91 F3d at 616. The defendant fired the plaintiff after he took two dollars
from the store's cash register, in violation of company policy, to buy cigarettes and failed to
replace the money or make a record of his taking the money. Id. at 613-15. The plaintiff
disclosed during questioning about this occurrence that he was HIV-positive. Id. at 614. His
complaint alleged violations of the ADA, ERISA, and the New Jersey Law Against
Discrimination as well as common law claims of defamation, invasion of privacy, violation of
public policy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, disclosing medical records of an
individual with AIDS, and breach of an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. Id. at 616
n.6.

2000

Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp.

awarded state disability benefits and social security disability
benefits. 79 The court noted that in each of these applications, the
plaintiff swore under penalty of perjury that he was unable to work
because of his disability.80 Agreeing that the doctrine of judicial
estoppel was properly invoked by the district court,8 ' the Third
Circuit held that the plaintiffs unconditional statements of total
disability on his benefits applications barred him from asserting
that he was a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA.82
The court did not agree that such a decision forced a plaintiff to
choose between seeking disability benefits and filing a claim under
the ADA.83
In the 1997 case of Harris v. Marathon Oil Co.,8 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed a district
court's decision to estop a plaintiff who claimed he was totally
disabled when applying for social security benefits from prevailing
in an ADA claim against his employer.8 5 The jury found in favor of
the plaintiff in the ADA claim; however, the employer was
successful in a motion for judgment as a matter of law when it
claimed that the plaintiffs certifications in his application for
disability benefits that he was completely disabled made it
impossible for him to claim that he was capable of performing the
79. Id at 615. Plaintiff also received an exemption from repayment of an educational
loan from the Pennsylvania Higher Education Agency after he certified that he was "unable
to work and earn money." Id at 615-16.
80. Id. at 615.
81. Id. at 618. The court adopted the two-part test articulated in Ryan Operations G.P.
v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F3d. 355, 361 (3rd Cir. 1996) which requires (1) that "the
party's present position be inconsistent with a position formerly asserted;" and (2) that "the
party assert either or both of the inconsistent positions in bad faith - - i.e., 'with intent to
play fast and loose' with the court." Id. at 618 (quoting Ryan, 81 E3d at 361).
82. McNemar, 91 F3d at 619. But cf. Krouse v. American Sterilizer Comp., 126 F.3d 494,
503 & n.5 (3rd Cir. 1996) (acknowledging criticism of the McNemar decision as
"well-founded" and advising district courts within the Third Circuit "not to assume that
McNemar always bars an individual's ADA claims merely because prior representations or
determinations of disability exist in the record").
83. McNemar, 91 E3d at 620. The court stated that:
[t]he fact that the choice between obtaining federal or state disability benefits and
suing under the ADA is difficult does not entitle one to make false representations
with impunity ....
Nothing grants a person the authority to flout the exalted status
that the law accords statements made under oath or penalty of perjury ....
Nothing
permits one to undermine the integrity of the judicial system.
Id. at 620.
84. 108 F3d 332 (5th Cir. 1997).
85. Harris, 108 F.3d at 332; Harris v. Marathon Oil Co., 948 F. Supp. 27, 30 (W.D. Tex.
1996).
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essential functions of his job.8 6 The district court agreed and noted
that to allow the plaintiff to assert that he was qualified to perform
the essential functions of his job while still collecting disability
benefits would "countenance a fraud" on either the court or the
87
Social Security Administration.
While there are numerous cases applying the estoppel doctrine or
otherwise precluding ADA recovery by a plaintiff who has applied
for or received social security disability benefits, a line of cases
rejecting this reasoning has also developed. 88 In one of the earliest
decisions in this line,8 9 the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, in Smith v. Dovenmuehle Mortgage,
Inc.,1° ruled in favor of an ADA plaintiff by denying an employer's
motion for summary judgment that was based upon the theory of
judicial estoppel.9 1 The court found it significant that, although the
86. Harris,948 F. Supp. at 29. The district court noted:
The Plaintiff does not dispute that he successfully advanced his "total disability"
assertion not only before the long-term disability plan administrator, but also before
the Social Security Administration. With equal enthusiasm, Mr. Harris proclaimed at
trial that he was ready, willing, and most importantly, able to perform the essential
functions of an oil field pumper. These positions are at best inconsistent.
Id. at 29.
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 138 F.3d 1304, 1312 (10th Cir. 1998)
(expressly rejecting the doctrine of judicial estoppel in ADA cases where the plaintiff has
alleged total disability on an application for social security disability benefits); Pegues v.
Emerson Elec. Co., 913 F Supp. 976, 980 (N.D. Miss. 1996) (holding that a finding of
disability by the Workers' Compensation Commission or the Social Security Administration
does not "necessarily foreclose" an ADA claim); Heise v. Genuine Parts Comp., 900 F. Supp.
1137, 1152 (D. Minn. 1995) (holding that receipt of social security disability benefits is
"relevant to demonstrate the extents of [one's] disability" but is not considered a "judgment
that [plaintiff] could not perform his job").
89. Several cases addressed the effect of statements of total disability in disability
applications on claims made under The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and concluded that the
doctrine of estoppel does not apply. See, e.g., Overton v. Reilly, 977 F.2d 1190 (7th Cir. 1992)
and Kupferschmidt v. Runyon, 827 F. Supp. 570 (E.D. Wis. 1993). The Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994), was the predecessor of the ADA and required "federal agencies
and federally funded programs to provide reasonable accommodations to persons with
disabilities." Diller, supra note 56, at 1003 n.2. The ADA requires agencies enforcing either
statute to apply them "in a manner that avoids duplication of effort and prevents imposition
of inconsistent or conflicting standards for the same requirements." 42 U.S.C. § 12117(b)
(1994). As a result, a number of courts rely on cases involving The Rehabilitation Act of 1973
as precedent for decisions regarding the effect of statements of total disability made for
purposes of obtaining disability benefits on an ADA claim. See, e.g., Heise, 900 F Supp. at
1152; Smith v. Dovenmuehle Mortgage, Inc., 859 F Supp. 1138, 1141-42 (N.D. I1. 1994).
90. 859 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. M. 1994).
91. Smith v. Dovenmuehle Mortgage, Inc., 859 F Supp. 1138 (N.D. M. 1994). In this
case, Smith alleged that he was fired and denied company-sponsored disability benefits
because he had AIDS. Id. at 1140. Defendant argued that, because Smith applied for and
received benefits from the SSA after certifying that he was disabled, he was precluded from
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699

plaintiff claimed to be disabled after he was terminated, both the
plaintiff and his physician subsequently testified that he had
recovered from his disability.9 2 Further, the court noted that the
theory of judicial estoppel would unfairly force the plaintiff to
choose between seeking disability benefits and filing an ADA claim
and would also undermine the anti-discrimination purposes of the
93
ADA.
In 1997, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit explicitly departed from the judicial estoppel
theory and ruled in Swanks v. Washington Metropolitan Area
Transit Authority94 that application for or receipt of social security
disability benefits does not bar an individual from seeking recovery
under the ADA. 95 The court based its decision on the fact that the
determination of eligibility for social security disability benefits
does not take into account the claimant's ability to work were
reasonable accommodations provided. 96 The Swanks court
bolstered its reasoning by relying on memoranda from both the
Social Security Administration and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). 97 These indicate, respectively,
that the effect of reasonable accommodations is not a factor in
determining eligibility for social security disability benefits and that
the receipt of such benefits does not establish a per se bar against
recovering under the ADA. Id. at 1140.
92. Id. at 1142.
93. Id. The court remarked:
Defendant's position [of judicial estoppel] would place plaintiff in the untenable
position of choosing between his right to seek disability benefits and his right to seek
redress for an alleged violation of the ADA. Moreover, it would conflict with one of
the stated purposes of the ADA which is to combat "the continuing existence of unfair
and unnecessary discrimination and prejudice [that] denies people with disabilities the
opportunity to compete on an equal basis and to pursue those opportunities for which
our free society is justifiably famous, and [that] costs the United States billions of
dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and nonproductivity.
Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(9) (1994)).
94. 116 F.3d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
95. Swanks, 116 F.3d 582. Officer Swanks argued that he was fired because of his spina
bifida, which caused him to suffer urinary infections, incontinence and, consequently,
frequent absences from work. Id. at 583-84. Defendant alleged that Swanks was fired
because he could not produce his Special Police Certification when asked, and because he
lied about having a current certification. Id. at 584.
96. Id. at 584. After describing the five-step process used by the Social Security
Administration in determining whether an individual is disabled for disability benefits
purposes, the court noted that "nowhere . . . does the Social Security Administration take
account of the possible effect of reasonable accommodation on a claimant's ability to work."
Id. at 585.
97. Id. at 585-86.
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an ADA claim.9 8 The court noted, however, that its decision did not
label evidence regarding the application for or receipt of disability
benefits as irrelevant in all ADA cases. 99
The issue was addressed again in 1997 by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Talavera v. School
Board of Palm Beach County'0 when it considered a district
court's application of judicial estoppel to bar a secretary who
asserted in her application for social security disability benefits that
she was "homebound" from advancing an ADA claim against her
employer. 10 1 In its reversal, the appellate court referred to the
Swanks court's focus on the five-step process for obtaining social
security disability benefits and the enforcement guidelines
promulgated by the EEOC as persuasive evidence that the
definition of disability was not the same for social security
disability determination and ADA purposes. 012 The court also found
it significant that the plaintiff in this case specifically noted on her
disability application that reasonable accommodations were not
provided to her before she was terminated. °m The Eleventh Circuit
rejected a per se rule that would automatically prevent a plaintiff
who had asserted that she was totally disabled in an application for
98. The court points to an Information Memorandum from the Social Security
Administration that states that "[t]he fact that an individual may be able to return to a past
relevant job, provided that the employer make accommodations, is not relevant." Id. at 585.
(citing DANIEL L SKOLER. COMM'R SOC. SEC. ADMIN., DIsABmLrrms ACT INFO. MEM. 2. No. SG3P2
(1993)). The court also acknowledged that the EEOC issued enforcement guidelines that
specifically negated the use of judicial estoppel. Those guidelines state:
Because of the fundamental differences in the definitions used in the ADA and the
terms used in disability benefits programs, an individual can meet the eligibility
requirements for receipt of disability benefits and still be a "qualified individual with a
disability" for ADA purposes. Thus, a person's representations that s/he is "totally
disabled" or "unable to work" for purposes of disability benefits are never an absolute
bar to an ADA claim.
Swanks, 116 F3d at 586 (citing EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON THE EFFECT OF
REPRESENTATIONS

MADE IN APPLICATIONS FOR BENEFITS ON THE DETERMINATION

PERSON IS A "QUALIFIED INDIVIDUAL WITH A DIsABiirr"

OF WHETHER A

UNDER THE AMERICANS wrrH

DisABIu'rEs

ACT OF 1990 at 3 (1997)).
99.

Swanks, 116 E3d at 587. In the court's example, evidence that a plaintiff indicated

on an application for disability benefits application that he could not have done the job even
with reasonable accommodation would be relevant evidence that may bar a subsequent ADA
claim. Id. See also Blanton v. Inco Alloys Int'l, Inc., 123 F.3d 916 (6th Cir. 1997) (clarifying
the Sixth Circuit's rejection of judicial estoppel in ADA cases but noting that plaintiff's
admissions and the medical evidence presented in the case rendered plaintiff unable to
perform his former job as a matter of law).
100. 129 F3d 1214 (11th Cir. 1997).
101. Talavera, 129 E3d at 1215.

102. Id. at 1218-19.
103. Id. at 1220.

2000

Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp.

social security disability benefits from bringing an ADA claim.10 4
However, it also adopted a rule that prevents an ADA plaintiff from
asserting that statements made in her application for social security
disability benefits were untrue. 10 5
In Griffith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,10 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit overruled a district court decision that
precluded the ADA claim of a plaintiff who applied for and was
granted social security disability benefits for a recurring back
injury.107 Similar to the D.C. and Eleventh Circuits, the Sixth Circuit
relied on the SSNs exclusion of the effect of reasonable
accommodation when determining eligibility for disability benefits
as a factor mandating against the use of a per se rule. 08 The
Griffith court did not rely on this factor alone; it held that judicial
estoppel was altogether inappropriate because it would allow an
administrative decision by the Social Security Administration to
usurp the "truth-seeking" role of the court. °9 Instead, the Sixth
Circuit ruled that statements made in an attempt to obtain social
security disability benefits should be evaluated as merely one piece
of relevant evidence and "analyzed under traditional summary
judgment principles. " 11°
104. Id. The court noted that "[a] certification of total disability on an SSD application
does mean that the applicant cannot perform the essential functions of her job without
reasonable accommodation. It does not necessarily mean that the applicant cannot perform
the essential functions of her job with reasonable accommodation." Id.
105. Id. The court rationalized that "an ADA plaintiff should not be permitted to
disavow any statements she made in order to obtain SSD benefits." Id.
106. 135 F.3d 376 (6th Cir. 1998).
107. Griffith, 135 F3d at 383. In Griffith, the plaintiff claimed that Wal-Mart
discriminated against him in violation of the ADA by firing him due to his back injury Id. at
378. The defendant claimed that Griffith was fired for "failing to report to work and lack of
dependability." Id.
108. Id. at 382. The court notes that "judicial estoppel does not apply because the
answers given in a Social Security disability benefit application are not necessarily
inconsistent with a plaintiffs claim that he could have worked at his job, during the relevant
period, with a reasonable accommodation." Id.
109. Id. Specifically, the court supported its rejection of the doctrine by stating that
"[a]pplying judicial estoppel under the circumstances presented here would be inappropriate
given that the truth-seeking function of the court would be supplanted by an agency
administrative decision rendered without an evidentiary hearing." Id.
110. Id. at 383. The court followed the approach adopted by the Seventh Circuit in
Weigel v. Target Stores, 122 F3d 461 (7th Cir. 1997), which provided that:
[wihen a defendant in an ADA action relies on [statements of total disability made to
obtain disability benefits] as the basis for contending that a plaintiff is not a "qualified
individual," the plaintiff is free to come forward with additional evidence that shows
she could perform the essential duties of a desired position with or without
reasonable accommodation notwithstanding the fact that she might have been deemed
disabled under some other statutory or contractual framework.
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In 1998, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
considered Johnson v. State of Oregon,"' a case involving an ADA
plaintiff who had represented that she was disabled or totally
disabled on applications for social security disability benefits and
for private short-term disability benefits and in a letter to the
Internal Revenue Service, which she wrote in an attempt to explain
the late filing of her tax return." 2 In rejecting a per se rule of
judicial estoppel, the court noted that analysis of whether a person
is a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA is "highly
fact-specific," while the determination of disability under the Social
Security Act is the result of a "generalized assessment."" 3 The
Johnson court was also convinced that forcing plaintiffs to choose
between applying for disability benefits and seeking relief for
discrimination under the ADA would undermine the purpose and
effectiveness of the ADA."' Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit
specifically stated that its ruling in Johnson did not make
representations of total disability irrelevant in an ADA claim and
acknowledged that while a per se rule was undesirable, judicial
estoppel could still be invoked in specific cases if the facts
115
warranted such an invocation.
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Cleveland is
Id. at 468.
111. 141 F3d 1361 (9th Cir. 1998).
112. Johnson, 141 F.3d at 1364-65. The plaintiff suffered from carpal tunnel syndrome
and alleged that her former employer was unwilling to make reasonable accommodations
which would have allowed her to perform her job. Id. at 1364.
113. Id. at 1366. Similar to the D.C. and Eleventh Circuits, the court made reference to
the failure of the social security disability benefit process to take into account the effect of
reasonable accommodations and to the enforcement guidelines issued by the EEOC. Id. at
1366-67.
114. Id. at 1368. The court reasoned that the doctrine of judicial estoppel might result
in the following:
Some potential plaintiffs might abandon pursuit of their rights under the ADA if they
could not apply for disability benefits. Faced with the financial pressures
accompanying the loss of a job and the uncertainty and length of litigation, individuals
might well elect immediate benefits over the pursuit of even the most meritorious
ADA claim. Such a situation would not only harm the individuals the ADA seeks to
protect, it would also protect the very activity the ADA seeks to eliminate:
discrimination against disabled individuals. Employers who discriminate unlawfully
would be shielded from liability if their victims could sue them only if they did not
apply for disability benefits.
Id. (footnote omitted).
115. Id. at 1369. The court remarked that judicial estoppel would be within a trial
court's discretion when "prior representations on disability benefits [applications] may
demonstrate that a claimant is playing fast and loose with the courts, seeking advantage by
advancing mutually exclusive contentions before the court and benefits providers." Id.

2000

Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp.

correct as far as concluding that Carolyn Cleveland should have
been afforded the opportunity to explain the discrepancy between
her claim, while seeking social security disability benefits, that she
was totally disabled, and her later claim that she was a qualified
individual with a disability under the ADA. Cleveland's assertion
that her statements of total disability on social security disability
benefit applications were made in a context that did not consider
the effect of reasonable accommodations was accurate and
warranted further investigation. 116 Similarly, the Cleveland Court
was correct in concluding that Cleveland should have been able to
expound on her explanation that the statements on her claims for
disability benefits were accurate at the time she made them and
7
did not inherently conflict with her ADA claim."
Moreover, the Court's decision that the application for or receipt
of disability benefits must'not operate to "automatically estop" an
individual from pursuing recovery under the ADA is sound. 118 The
differences in both the purpose of the SSA and ADA statutes and
the process by which a disability determination is made under each
make an automatic preclusion unjust and unwarranted. 119 However,
the Cleveland Court erred in rejecting the Fifth Circuit's rule that
statements of total disability made in pursuit of disability benefits
establish a rebuttable presumption that an individual cannot be a
qualified individual with a disability under the ADA.
The establishment of a rebuttable presumption that an individual
who has applied for or received social security disability benefits
cannot be a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA
does not hamper the effectiveness of the ADA nor does it set back
the advancements gained by the disabled community through the
passage of the Act. Rather, such a presumption enhances the
integrity of both the social security disability process and a cause
of action brought under the ADA by preventing an individual who
has asserted that she is completely disabled or totally unable to
work from essentially disavowing those statements when pursuing
recovery under the ADA without overcoming a significant, but not
impossible, barrier.
The Court's minimal requirement that a plaintiff must merely
116.
117.
118.
119.
§ 5:18 at

Cleveland, 119 S. Ct. at 1604.
Id.
Id. at 1600.
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"explain" 120 any inconsistency between her two claims does not give
proper weight to the sworn statements, made while seeking social
security disability benefits, that she was totally disabled and allows
her to assert two contrary positions without due scrutiny from the
courts. The adoption of a rebuttable presumption against the
validity of an ADA claim made by an individual who has already
asserted that she is completely and totally disabled in an earlier
proceeding does not prevent a qualified individual from prevailing
under the ADA. Instead, it requires that such an individual
convincingly demonstrate to the court that, while statements of
total disability made in order to obtain disability benefits were true
and accurate, she can nonetheless prove that she could perform the
essential functions of her job with or without reasonable
accommodations. Such a requirement is evenhanded and strikes an
appropriate balance among the interests of the disabled, the
anti-discriminatory purpose of the ADA, and the integrity of the
121
judicial system.
Jane M. Keenan

120. Cleveland, 119 S. Ct. at 1604. The Court stated:
When faced with a plaintiff's previous sworn statement asserting "total disability" or
the like, the court should require an explanation of any apparent inconsistency with
the necessary elements of an ADA claim. To defeat summary judgment, that
explanation must be sufficient to warrant a reasonable juror's concluding that,
assuming the truth of, or the plaintiff's good faith belief in, the earlier statement, the
plaintiff could nonetheless "perform the essential functions" of her job, with or
without "reasonable accommodation."
Id.
121. Brief for Respondent at 22, Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 119 S. Ct.
1597 (1999) (No. 97-1008).

